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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197 (2011)
Synopsis:
Under 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a), a veteran whose claim for federal
benefits is denied by the Board of Veterans' Appeals may appeal to
the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Court within 120
days after the date when the Board's final decision is properly
mailed.' This case presents the question whether a veteran's failure
to file a notice of appeal within the 120-day period should be
regarded as having "jurisdictional" consequences. 2 The Supreme
Court of the United States held that it should not.3
Facts, Analysis, and Ruling:
Petitioner David Henderson ("Henderson"), who served in the
military during the Korean War, was given a one hundred percent
disability by the Department Veterans Affairs ("VA") in 1992.4
However, in 2001, when he filed a claim with the VA for
supplemental benefits based on his need for in-home care, both the
Regional VA office and the Board of Veterans' Appeals denied his
claim.s He subsequently filed a notice of appeal with the Veterans
Court but missed the 120-day deadline by fifteen days.6
The Veterans Court initially dismissed Henderson's appeal as
untimely but then granted his motion for reconsideration and set the
case for argument.' While his appeal was pending, however, Bowles
v. Russell' was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States.'
The Court in Bowles held that the statutory limitation on the length of
' See Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1200 (2011).
2 See id.
'See id.
4 See id. at 1201.
'See id.
See id.
See id.
551 U.S. 205 (2007).
See Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1201.
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an extension of the time to file a notice of appeal in an ordinary civil
case'o is jurisdictional as defined by the Court."
Whenever something, including a procedural rule, is determined
to be "jurisdictional," it goes directly to the subject matter
jurisdiction of the court. While federal courts are generally limited to
those claims and arguments advanced by the parties in a particular
case, they also have an "independent obligation to ensure that they do
not exceed the scope of their jurisdiction, and therefore they must
raise and decide jurisdictional questions that the parties either
overlook or decide not to press." 2 In addition, an objection to
subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time.13 Even if a
party has already lost the case, it may still raise an objection to
subject-matter jurisdiction.14 And it may still raise such an objection
even if the party had previously acknowledged the trial court's
jurisdiction." And if the court indeed lacks jurisdiction, everything
else goes "out the window," so to speak; all the prior work on the
case may be wasted.16
When a procedural rule is determined to be jurisdictional, a
party's failure to comply with that rule cannot be excused-neither
equitable factors nor an opposing party's forfeiture or waiver of any
objection for the failure to comply can excuse it." So when the
Court in Bowles decided that the statutory limitation of time for filing
a notice of appeal in an ordinary civil case was jurisdictional, it
meant that failure to file notice of appeal within the given time period
for any reason meant the end of the court's jurisdiction in that case.' 8
And nothing could reinstate the court's jurisdiction in that particular
case.19
After Bowles came out, the Veterans Court instructed the parties
in Henderson's case to "brief that decision's effect on prior Federal
1o Under 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) (2006).
"See Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1201.
12 See id. at 1202.
' See id.
14 See id.
" See id.
I6 See id.
17 See id. at 1201-03.
1 See id.
19 See id.
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Circuit precedent that allowed the equitable tolling of the 120-day
deadline for filing a notice of appeal in the Veterans Court." 20 The
Veterans Court decided that the Bowles rule "compelled
jurisdictional treatment of the 120-day deadline and dismissed
Henderson's untimely appeal for lack of jurisdiction," and the
Federal Circuit affirmed this decision.21
In order for the Court to determine if a procedural is
"jurisdictional," it must look to see whether there is any clear
indication that Congress wanted the rule to be "jurisdictional."22 In
this regard, it is not necessary that Congress expressly state whether a
particular rule is jurisdictional-context, including precedential
history of the interpretation of similar provisions, is relevant.2 3
"When 'a long line of this Court's decisions left undisturbed by
Congress' [internal citations omitted] has treated a similar
requirement as 'jurisdictional,' we will presume that Congress
intended to follow that course." 24
Using this standard, the Court went on to determine whether the
120-day filing deadline under 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a) is jurisdictional.2 5
20 See id. at 1202.
21 Id.
22 See id. at 1203. The Court, in recent cases, has tried to "bring some
discipline" to the use of the term "jurisdictional" because of the "drastic"
consequences that result. Id. In this regard, the Court "has urged that a rule should
not be referred to as jurisdictional unless it governs a court's adjudicatory capacity,
that is, its subject-matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction." Id. "Among the
types of rules that should not be described as jurisdictional are . . . 'claim-
processing rules,"' which are rules that "seek to promote the orderly process of
litigation by requiring that the parties take certain procedural steps at certain
specified times," rules such the filing deadline at issue in this case. Id. However,
because Congress is free to attach the jurisdictional label or conditions to any rule,
including rules the Court would define as "claim-processing," the Court must look
to Congress's intent of whether a rule be treated as jurisdictional. See id.
23 See id.
24 Id
25 See id. The Government, respondent here, argued that Bowles held that all
statutory deadlines for taking appeals in civil cases are jurisdictional, and therefore,
because the 120-day deadline at issue here was for taking an appeal in a civil case,
the deadline is jurisdictional. See id. The Court rejected this argument in that it
mischaracterized the holding in Bowles-Bowles concerned an appeal from one
court to another and "did not hold categorically that every deadline for seeking
judicial review in civil litigation is jurisdictional." Id. The Government also
31-1
To make this determination, the Court looked at the following three
factors: (1) the terms of the provision setting the deadline, (2) the
deadline's placement within the Veterans' Judicial Review Act
("VJRA"), and (3) the characteristics of the review scheme Congress
created for the adjudication of veterans' benefits claims.26 Regarding
the first factor, the Court examined the language of Section 7266(a),
which states the following:
In order to obtain review by the Court of Appeals
for Veterans Claims of a final decision of the Board of
Veterans' Appeals, a person adversely affected by
such decision shall file a notice of appeal with the
Court within 120 days after the date on which notice
of the decision is mailed pursuant to section 7104(e)
of this title.27
Reviewing this language, the Court stated, "This provision 'does
not speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the
jurisdiction of the [Veterans Court].' 28 The Court further reasoned,
"If Congress had wanted the 120-day time to be treated as
jurisdictional, it could have cast that provision in language like that in
[another] provision of the VJRA" that clearly signals Congress'
intent for that provision to be treated as jurisdictional. 29 But the
language for the 120-day deadline at issue is not framed in
argued that the reasoning in Bowles extended to judicial review of administrative
decisions, citing other decisions where courts have held deadlines for filing a
petition to review a final agency decision was jurisdictional. See id. at 1204. The
Court rejected this argument as well, noting that "Congress has made it clear that
the VA is not an ordinary agency." Id. (citing Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S. Ct. 1696,
1707 (2009)). The Court also noted that the VA is like the Social Security benefits
program in that both are unusually protective of claimants. See Henderson, 131 S.
Ct. at 1204. Another similarity between the two is that both have similar review
mechanisms for claimants. See id And the Court has previously held that the
deadline for obtaining review of a Social Security benefits decision in district court
is not jurisdictional. See id. But despite the extraordinary nature of the VA and its
similarities to the Social Security system, the Court was not controlled by
precedent here and needed to perform the analysis to determine Congress' intent
regarding the 120-day deadline at issue in this case. See id.
26 See id. at 1204-06.
27 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a).
28 Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1204 (citing Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
455 U.S. 385, 394 (1982)).
29 Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1204-05.
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comparable language. 30 "Thus," the Court reasoned, "the language
of [Section] 7266 provides no clear indication that Congress wanted
that provision to be treated as having jurisdictional attributes." 31
Next, the Court considered deadline's placement within the
VJRA. Congress placed Section 7266 in a subchapter entitled
"Procedure" and elected not to place that section in the VJRA
subchapter entitled "Organization and Jurisdiction."32 The Court
took this placement as an indication that Congress regarded the 120-
day limit more as a claim-processing rule than it did a jurisdictional
one.33 The Court further noted that within the subchapter
"Organization and Jurisdiction," were subsections addressing the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Veterans Court to review decisions of
the Board of Veterans' Appeals but not appeals from the VA
Secretary and limiting the scope and content of that court's review,
but that nothing in this provision addresses the time for seeking
Veterans Court review.34 Based on these circumstances, the Court
determined that Section 7266's placement within the VJRA
"provided no clear indication that Congress wanted that provision to
be treated as having jurisdictional attributes." 35
The Court then examined the third factor and determined that
what was most telling of Congress' intent for this provision was "the
singular characteristics of the review scheme that Congress created
for the adjudication of veterans' benefits claims."3 6 The attentiveness
and consideration of Congress for veterans is long standing and well-
established and is clearly reflected in the VJRA and other,
subsequent laws addressing the administrative and judicial review of
VA decisions-these statutes and laws weigh heavily in favor of
veterans. 37 And according to the Court, the gap of differences
between the system of ordinary civil litigation that was the context
30 Id. at 1205. The Court noted that the language of Section 7266 is
mandatory, but it further noted that it has "rejected the notion that 'all mandatory
prescriptions [are jurisdictional]."' Id.
3' Id.
32 See id.
3 See id.
34 See id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
n See id.
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for the Bowles decision and the system that Congress created for the
adjudication of veterans' benefits claims is vast and could hardly be
wider. 38 In ordinary civil litigation, plaintiffs must generally
commence their suits within the time specified by a statute of
limitations; the litigation is adversarial; plaintiffs must gather the
evidence and support for their claims and generally bear the burden
of production and persuasion; both parties may appeal an adverse
decision; and a final judgment may only be reopened in narrow
circumstances. 39 In the system established by Congress for review of
veterans' benefits claims, a veteran may commence his or her claim
at any time after the alleged onset of disability or separation from
service; the proceedings are informal and nonadversarial; the VA
must assist veterans in gathering evidence to support their claims and
must give veterans the benefit of the doubt; only the veteran or his or
her representative can appeal an adverse decision; and a denied claim
may be reopened simply if the veteran presents new and material
evidence.40 According to the Court, "Rigid jurisdictional treatment
of the 120-day period for filing a notice of appeal in the Veterans
Court would clash sharply with [the scheme developed by Congress
for the adjudication of veterans' benefits claims]." 4 1 Based on the
evaluation and analysis of the above factors, the Court found no clear
indication that Congress intended the 120-day limit to be
jurisdictional, and thus held that "the deadline for filing a notice of
appeal with the Veterans Court does not have jurisdictional
attributes."4 2 The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.
The impact of this case is clear: (1) the discretion and leniency
afforded veterans in the adjudication of their benefits claims is wide
and steadfast; (2) the assignment of the "jurisdictional" label to a
particular requirement is narrowly constructed because it is such a
harsh and unforgiving label. Because veterans are afforded such
great leniency and viewed in a benevolent manner, and because the
3 See id. at 1205-06.
39 See id. at 1206.
40 See id.
41 Id. (emphasis added).
42 Id. at 1206.
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jurisdictional label is so harsh, there must be clear indication that
Congress intended a particular rule or requirement to be
jurisdictional. Deriving Congress's intention may include examining
a statutory provision's particular language, context, and the subject
matter that it addresses. The results of this case may give those who
represent veterans in administrative claims significant leeway in
arguing for the benefit of those veterans, but this case may also raise
questions as to how wide the leniency given to veterans actually is.
Here, the deadline was missed by fifteen days; what if it had been
thirty days? Or sixty? Or ninety? At what point would a 120-day
deadline actually become a deadline? While the deadline is not
jurisdictional per se, and veterans should be afforded significant
leniency, one potential impact is that the efficacy of the deadline has
been eroded, and the deadline may become pointless should courts
choose to ignore delays in filings by parties.
Kucana v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 827 (2010)
Synopsis:
Petitioner Argon Kucana moved to reopen his removal
proceedings based on new evidence in support of his plea for
asylum.43 An Immigration Judge ("IJ") denied Kucana's motion, and
the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA" or "Board") sustained that
ruling; when Kucana appealed to the United States Court of Appeal
for the Seventh Circuit, that court concluded it lacked jurisdiction
based on a provision added to the Immigration and Nationality Act"
("INA" or "Act") by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 199645 that "states that no court shall have
jurisdiction to review any action of the Attorney General 'the
authority for which is specified under this chapter to be in the
discretion of the Attorney General."' 46 The Supreme Court of the
United States "granted certiorari to decide whether the proscription
of judicial review stated in [Section] 1252(a)(2)(B) applies not only
to Attorney General determinations made discretionary by statute,
43 See Kucana v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 827, 831 (2010).
448 U.S.C § 1101 et seq. (2010).
45 110 Stat. 3009-546.
46 Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at 831 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)).
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but also to determinations declared discretionary by the Attorney
General himself through regulation" and held that "the key words
'specified under this subchapter' refer to statutory, but not to
regulatory, specifications."47 Based on this holding, the Court
reversed the Seventh Circuit's ruling and remanded the case.48
Facts. Analysis, and Ruling:
Kucana is a citizen of Albania who entered the United States in
1995 on a business visa and remained after the visa expired.49 He
applied for political asylum and withholding of removal in 1996.o
The IJ reviewing Kucana's case determined that Kucana was
removable and scheduled a hearing on Kucana's application for
asylum." However, Kucana missed this hearing,52 and the IJ ordered
Kucana's removal.53 Kucana filed a motion to reopen, but the IJ
denied his motion, and the BIA affirmed this decision in 2002.54
Despite this, Kucana "did not seek judicial review, nor did he leave
the United States."
Four years later, Kucana filed his second motion to reopen,
alleging that he could not go back to Albania because conditions had
worsened there since the time of his initial filing.56 But the BIA
denied this motion, finding that "conditions in Albania had actually
improved since 1997."57 Kucana then filed a petition for review in
47 Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at 831.
48 Id. at 831, 839.
'9 See id. at 832.
50 See id. Kucana "alleg[ed] that he would be persecuted based on his political
beliefs if [he was] returned to Albania." Id.
' See id.
52 According to Kucana, he missed his hearing because he overslept. See id
53 See id.
54 See id.
55 Id
56 See id. Each alien is given the right to file one motion to reopen
proceedings; further motions to reopen in proceedings seeking asylum or
withholding of removal are permitted when conditions within the country of
nationality or removal have changed. See id. at 833 n.5.
57 Id. at 832-33.
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the Seventh Circuit, arguing that the BIA had abused its discretion in
denying his motion.
However, the Seventh Circuit, in a split opinion, dismissed
Kucana's petition for review for lack ofjurisdiction.5 9 The Seventh
Circuit made this holding under the belief that Congress removed the
authority to review denials of an alien's motion to reopen-an
authority long held and exercised by federal courts60 -when it
created Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which, according to the Seventh
Circuit, "bars judicial review not only of administrative decisions
made discretionary by statute, but also 'when the agency's discretion
is specified by a regulation rather than a statute."' 6 1 This decision
created a rift in the Circuits because other Courts of Appeal had held
that denials of reopening motions are reviewable in court.62 The
Supreme Court of the United States "granted certiorari [citations
omitted] to resolve the Circuit conflict." 63
The provision at issue is contained within 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a)(2)(B), under a heading entitled "Denials of discretionary
relief," and reads in pertinent part as follows:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of law
(statutory or non statutory), ... except as provided in
subparagraph (D), and regardless of whether the
judgment, decision, or action is made in removal
proceedings, no court shall have jurisdiction to
review-
i.any judgment regarding the granting of relief
under section 1182(h), 1182(i), 1229b, 1229c,
or 1255 of this title, or
18 See id. at 833.
See Kucana v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 534, 539 (7th Cir. 2008).
so"The motion to open is an 'important safeguard' intended 'to ensure a proper
and lawful disposition' of immigration proceedings." Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at 834
(quoting Dada v. Mukasey, 128 S. Ct. 2307, 2317-19 (2008)). "Federal court
review of administrative decisions denying motions to reopen removal proceedings
dates back to at least 1916." Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at 834.
6 Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at 833 (quoting Kucana, 533 F.3d at 536); see also
Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at 834.62 See Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at 833.
63 d.
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ii.any other decision or action of the Attorney
General ... the authority for which is specified
under this subchapter to be in the discretion of
the Attorney General . . ., other than the
granting of relief under section 1158(a) of this
title."6"
The Supreme Court noted that a regulation propounded by the
Attorney General states that "[t]he decision to grant or deny a motion
to reopen . .. is within the discretion of the Board." 6 5 In addition,
"As adjudicator in immigration cases, the Board exercises authority
delegated by the Attorney General." 66
The parties, particularly amicus, read the word under in Section
1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) as being key.67 Amicus argued that under means
"pursuant to," "subordinate to," "below or lower than," "inferior in
rank or importance," and "by reason of the authority of."68 Under
this interpretation, administrative regulations fall within Section
1252(a)(2)(B) because "they are issued 'pursuant to,' and are
measures 'subordinate to,' the legislation they serve to implement." 69
The parties, however, read the phrase "specified under this
subchapter" to mean "specified in," or "specified by," the
subchapter.70 The Court reasoned that, "[o]n the reading amicus
advances, [Section] 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) would bar judicial review of
any decision that an executive regulation places within the BIA's
discretion," whereas on the parties' reading, that section would
"preclude[] judicial review only when the statute itself specifies the
discretionary character of the Attorney General's authority."7
Despite these various interpretations of the word under in Section
1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), the Court could not resolve the case from these
* 8 U.S.C 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) (2005).
6 See Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at 832, 835 (quoting 8 C.F.R. 1003.2(a) (2009)).
66 Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at 832.
67 See id. at 835.
68 See id.
69 Id
70 See id.
n1 Id.
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interpretations alone.72 To make its determination, the Court also
looked to the context of the statute, 73 the history of the relevant
statutory provisions,74 and the principle of statutory construction that
favors judicial review of administrative action.
Regarding the context of Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), the Court first
looked to the placement of that section and to the nature of the
subsections immediately preceding and succeeding Section
1252(a)(2)(B), subsections (a)(2)(A) and (a)(2)(C), respectively.76
"[T]he words of a statute must be read in their context and with a
view to their place in the overall statutory scheme."77 Looking at the
sections between which Section 1252(a)(2)(B) is sandwiched, the
Court noted that both Section 1252(a)(2)(A) and Section
1252(a)(2)(C) "depend on statutory provisions, not on any regulation,
to define their scope."78 Because of the placement of Section
1252(a)(2)(B) "between subsections (a)(2)(A) and (a)(2)(C), one
would expect that it, too, would cover statutory provisions alone."
Next, the Court looked to the context within Section 1252(a)(2)(B)
itself. Looking at Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), the Court noted that
clause (i) refers to enumerated statutory provisions but not to any
regulatory provision. Keeping this in mind, the Court noted, "The
proximity of clauses (i) and (ii), and the words linking them-'any
other decision'-suggests that Congress had in mind decisions of the
same genre, i.e., those made discretionary by legislation."' 0 The
Court reasoned that the clause (i) enumeration of specific statutes is
"instructive in determining the meaning of the clause (ii) catchall [at
issue]." 81 Thus, "Read harmoniously, both clauses convey that
Congress barred court review of discretionary decisions only when
Congress itself set out the Attorney General's discretionary authority
72 See id.
7 See id.
74 See id at 838.
7 See id. at 839.
76 See id. at 836.
7 Id (quoting Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809
(1989)).
7 8 See Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at 836.
79 Id.
80Id
81Id
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in the statute." 82 The Court found further contextual significance in
the character of the decisions Congress enumerated in clause (i); the
decisions listed in clause (i) involve substantive determinations made
by the executive as a matter of grace, including waivers of
inadmissibility based on certain criminal offenses and cancellation of
removal. Thus, other decisions specified by statute to be within the
discretion of the Attorney General and insulated from judicial review
are of a like kind: substantive determinations made by the Executive
as a matter of grace. The Court reasoned that a motion to reopen is a
procedural device, not a substantive one, that "touches and concerns
only the question whether the alien's claims have been accorded a
reasonable hearing."83 The Court then further noted that had
Congress intended the jurisdictional bar of Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)
to encompass decisions specified as discretionary by regulation in
addition to those made so by statute, it easily could have said so, as it
had in other provisions enacted at the same time Section
1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) was enacted. 84 "[W]here Congress includes
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another
section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion."85
Having examined the context of Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), the Court
then turned to its history.
In 1996, Congress enacted IIRIRA and codified the motion to
reopen as a form of relief available to aliens, which motion had
previously been a regulatory procedure. 86 Congress also
simultaneously enacted legislation that expedited the removal of
aliens lacking legal basis to remain and established several
proscriptions of judicial review, including the one at issue, Section
1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). 87 However, Congress "did not codify the
regulation delegating to the BIA discretion to grant or deny motions
82 Id. at 836-37. The principle allowing such a conclusion can be found in Hall
Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008), which states, "When
a statute sets out a series of specific items ending with a general term, that general
term is confined to covering subjects comparable to the specifics it follows."
" See Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at 837.
84 See id.
85 Id. at 838 (quoting Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1759 (2009)).
86 See Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at 838.
87 See id
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to reopen."88 Because Congress was silent on the discretion of the
Attorney General over reopening motions, the Court inferred that
Congress had left the law where it was before Congress enacted
IIRIRA, and the state of the law before IIRIRA was that the BIA had
wide discretion to grant or deny motions to reopen, but courts had the
jurisdiction to review those decisions. 89 By the time Congress
amended the INA, at least two Courts of Appeals had ruled that
Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) did not bar them from reviewing denials of
motions to reopen, yet Congress "did not disturb the unbroken line of
decisions upholding court review of administrative denials of
motions to reopen" when it amended the INA. 90 Again, the Court
seemed to interpret Congress's silence on this issue as indicative of
complacence with the state of the law.91
The final area of consideration for the Court here was the general
principle of statutory construction that is a "presumption favoring
judicial review of administrative action." 92 Because this presumption
is well-settled, "the Court assumes that 'Congress legislates with
knowledge of this presumption," and it "takes 'clear and convincing
evidence' to dislodge the presumption."93 Because there was no such
evidence here, the presumption held firm.94 The Court went on to
mention that, as a policy matter, should the Seventh Circuit's
interpretation of Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) prevail, "the Executive
would have a free hand to shelter its own decisions from abuse-of-
discretion appellate court review simply by issuing a regulation
declaring those decisions 'discretionary,"' which goes far beyond the
authority Congress delegated here.95
"A statute affecting federal jurisdiction 'must be construed both
with precision and with fidelity to the terms by which Congress has
expressed its wishes." 96 Based on the words of the statutory
88 Id.
89 See id.
90 See id. at 839.
91 See id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 See id.
9 1 Id. at 840.
96 Id
31-1
provision, its context and history, and general principles of statutory
construction, Congress did not delegate to the Executive authority to
pare back judicial review of administrative decisions, and thus,
"[a]ction on motions to reopen, made discretionary by the Attorney
General only, . . . remain subject to judicial review." 97
Impact:
One broader aspect of this case that is particularly useful is that it
provides a framework of rules for statutory interpretation or
construction that may be used broadly when analyzing a particular
provision within a given statute, particularly those involving
administrative actions. When analyzing a provision's meaning and
scope, one may look to the provision's terms, context, placement,
history, and general principles of statutory construction to arrive at a
particular conclusion or at the knowledge of the legislature's
meaning. Based on the Court's analysis and conclusion in this case,
it seems that a general rule to follow when attempting to analyze a
statutory provision and determine a legislature's intention is to
interpret that provision as narrowly as possible unless there is strong
evidence in support otherwise.
A more immediate and narrow impact of this case is that aliens
are afforded significant protection in the reviewability of motions to
reopen. If, as here, an alien files a motion to reopen because the
country to which they will be returned has worsened conditions, the
denial of that motion by the BIA is reviewable by higher courts.
Regarding Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) itself, the ruling here
supports the proposition that only decisions made discretionary by
statute may be jurisdictionally barred from court review-decisions
made discretionary by other means, such as through regulation, do
not fit the bill and remain subject to review.
Milner v. Dep't of the Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259 (2011)
Synopsis:
The Freedom of Information Act98 ("FOIA") "requires federal
agencies to make Government records available to public, subject to
97 Id.
98 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2009).
413Spring 2011 Leg~al Summaries
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nine exemptions."99 Petitioner Glen Milner ("Petitioner" or
"Milner") submitted requests under the FOIA to Respondent
Department of the Navy ("Navy" or "Government") for explosives
data and maps used by the Navy in storing munitions at a naval base
in his hometown, Puget Sound, Washington. 00 The Navy denied his
request, stating that the disclosure would jeopardize the safety of the
base and its surrounding community and invoking "Exemption 2" of
the nine exemptions provided in the FOIA.10 Exemption 2 "protects
from disclosure material 'related solely to the internal personnel rules
and practices of an agency."' 102 The Court held that "[b]ecause
Exemption 2 encompasses only records relating to employee
relations and human resources issues, the explosives maps and data
requested here do not qualify for withholding under that
exemption." 03
Facts, Analysis, and Ruling:
"Congress enacted the FOIA to overhaul the public disclosure
section of the Administrative Procedure Act ["APA"]," which was
"plagued with vague phrases" and had become "more 'a withholding
statute than a disclosure statute."'104 The purpose of the FOIA was to
"permit access to official information long shielded unnecessarily
from public view," and, pursuant to this purpose, the FOIA requires
that "an agency disclose records on request, unless they fall within
one of nine exemptions."'0 One of these exemptions, Exemption 2,
the exemption at issue here, "shields from compelled disclosure
documents 'related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices
of an agency. "'106 Previously, the APA had exempted "any matter
relating solely to the internal management of an agency," but
Congress, in its revision of the APA with the FOIA, drafted
Exemption 2 to have a narrower reach than its predecessor under the
99Milner v. Dep't of the Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259, 1260 (2011).
"0 See id. at 1260, 1263-64.
1o' See id. at 1260.
102 See id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2)).
103 See id. at 1260.
11 See id. at 1262 (quoting EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973)).
' See Milner, 131 S. Ct. at 1262.
1o6 See id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2)).
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belief that "the 'sweep' of the phrase 'internal management' had led
to excessive withholding."' 0 7
In Department of the Air Force v. Rose,'os the Supreme Court of
the United States considered the scope of Exemption 2 and held that
it applies primarily to material concerning employee relations or
human resources, such as the use of parking facilities, regulations of
lunch hours, and statements of policy as to sick leave.'09 Viewing a
request for case summaries of honor and ethics hearings at the United
States Air Force Academy through this interpretation of Exemption
2, the Court in Rose held that the case summaries were not exempted
because they "d[id] not concern only routine matters" of "merely
internal significance."' 10
In its ruling in Rose, the Court also stated a possible caveat that
its interpretation of Exemption 2 governed "where the situation is not
one where disclosure may risk circumvention of agency
regulation.""' The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
later took this caveat and converted it into a rule in Crooker v.
Bureau ofAlcohol, Tobacco & Firearms.112 This new rule
established in Crooker covered any predominantly internal materials
the disclosure of which would "significantly ris[k] circumvention of
agency regulations or statutes." 1 l 3 Courts using the Crooker
approach "refer to the 'Low 2' exemption when discussing materials
concerning human resources and employee relations, and to the
'High 2' exemption when assessing records whose disclosure would
risk circumvention of the law." 1 4
'
1 See Milner, 131 S. Ct. at 1262.
10o 425 U.S. 352 (1976).
109 See id. at 363.
oId. at 370.
"' Id. at 369.
112 670 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
113 Id. at 1056-57, 1074. Three Courts of Appeals have adopted the D.C.
Circuit's interpretation of Exemption 2. See Milner, 131 S. Ct. at 1263. Congress
also took notice of the Crooker decision, using language from it when amending
the FOIA; Exemption 7(E) was amended to shield from disclosure "records or
information compiled for law enforcement purposes if their disclosure "could
reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law." See id. (quoting 5
U.S.C. 552(b)(7)(E)).
114 See Milner, 131 S. Ct. at 1263.
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Here, Milner, a resident of Puget Sound, Washington, submitted
to the Navy FOIA requests for all Explosive Safety Quantity
Distance ("ESQD") information relating to the Navy's operations at
Naval Magazine Indian Island, a naval base in Puget Sound."' The
Navy keeps various munitions, including weapons, ammunition, and
explosives, at this base, and the Navy uses ESQD data to aid in the
storage and transportation of these munitions." 6 The Navy refused
Milner's request, stating that the release of such information to the
public would threaten the security of the base and the surrounding
community, and the Navy invoked Exemption 2 to support its
position of denying disclosure of the requested information. "' The
District Court granted summary judgment in the Navy's favor, and
the Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on the Crooker decision and a
"High 2" analysis, stating that the ESQD information "is
predominantly used for the internal purpose of instructing agency
personnel on how to do their jobs" and that disclosure of tht
information would "risk circumvention of the law" by "point[ing] out
the best targets for those bent on wreaking havoc," such as
terrorists.18 The Supreme Court granted certiorari "in light of the
Circuit split respecting Exemption 2's meaning."" 9
In its consideration of Exemption 2's scope, the Court first
looked to the statutory text in which the exemption is found, which
simply reads "related solely to the internal personnel rules and
practices of an agency."1 20 According to the Court, the key word in
this text is "personnel," which modifies "rules and practices" and
refers to human resources matters.12' Generally, the term
" See id. at 1263-64.
116 See id. "ESQD information prescribes 'minimum separation distances' for
explosives and helps the Navy design and construct storage facilities to prevent
chain reactions in case of detonation." Id. at 1263. ESQD information is "often
incorporated into specialized maps depicting the effects of hypothetical
explosions." Id.
' See id. at 1264.
118 See id.
"1 Id.
120 See id. "Statutory construction must begin with the language employed by
Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately
expresses the legislative purpose." Id. (quoting Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park &
Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985)).
121 See Milner, 131 S. Ct. at 1264.
31-1
"personnel" means "the selection, placement, and training of
employees and. . . the formulation of policies, procedures, and
relations with [or involving] employees or their representatives."' 2 2
The Court also looked to other Exemptions within the FOIA and
noted that Exemption 6 uses the term "personnel" as a modifier
meaning "human resources," and "Exemption 2 uses 'personnel' in
the exact same way."' 23 "An agency's 'personnel rules and
practices' are its rules and practices dealing with employee relations
or human resources." 24 In other words, "[t]hey concern the
conditions of employment in federal agencies-such matters as
hiring and firing, work rules and discipline, compensation and
benefits."' 25 Given this construction of the statutory language in
which Exemption 2 is found, the Court held it is clear that "Low 2"-
materials concerning human resources and employee relations-is all
of Exemption 2.126
The Court further looked to the statutes purpose to shed
additional light on the meaning of Exemption 2.127 "We have often
noted 'the Act's goal of broad disclosure' and insisted that the
exemptions be 'given a narrow compass."'l 28 According to the
Court, the reason Congress worded Exemption 2 the way it did when
it revised the APA was to reign in the prior APA exemption that
"agencies had used to prevent access to masses of documents."' 29 As
the Court stated, "We would ill-serve Congress's purpose by
construing Exemption 2 to reauthorize the expansive withholding that
Congress wanted to halt." 3 0 "Our reading instead gives the
exemption the 'narrower reach' Congress intended .. . through the
simple device of confining the provision's meaning to its words."' 3 1
Under the Court's reading and construction of Exemption 2,
Exemption 2 "encompasses only records relating to issues of
122jd
123 See id. at 1265.
124
125  d
126 See id
127 See id.
128 Id
129 See id. at 1266.
130Id
131 Id
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employee relations and human resources."l 32 In light of this, the
Court held that the ESQD information at issue does not fall within
that exemption because the ESQD information is "data and maps
[that] calculate and visually portray the magnitude of hypothetical
detonations" and not related to 'personnel rules and practices,' as
that term is most naturally understood."1 33 The ESQD information,
data, and maps "concern the physical rules governing explosives, not
the workplace rules governing sailors; they address the handling of
dangerous materials, not the treatment of employees."' 3 4 In light of
this, the Court concluded that the Navy could not use Exemption 2 to
prevent disclosure of the requested EQSD information.' 35
132 Id. at 1271.
133 Id. at 1266.
134 d
135 See id. The Government offered two additional readings of Exemption 2 to
support withholding of the ESQD information: the construction of Exemption 2
established by Crooker, which implements the "High 2" circumvention test; and an
interpretation adopted "on a clean slate" and "based on the plain text ... alone."
See id. at 1266-67, 1269. The Court rejected the first reading because it is
disconnected with the text of Exemption 2 and has no basis in such. See id. at
1267. "The 1986 amendment does not ratify, approve, or otherwise signal
agreement with Crooker's interpretation of Exemption 2." Id. at 1268.
Regarding the second proffered reading, the Government argued that
Exemption 2 "encompasses records concerning an agency's internal rules and
practices for its personnel to follow in the discharge of their governmental
functions." Id. at 1269. Thus, according to the Government, Exemption 2 would
apply to all of an agency's rules and practices for its personnel, such as internal
rules and policies that guide personnel in performing their duties, and, under this
reading, the ESQD data would be exempted under Exemption 2 because it assists
Navy personnel in storing munitions. See id. But the Court rejected this reading as
well, stating that the "purported logic in the Government's definition eludes us."
Id. "We would not say, in ordinary parlance, that a 'personnel file' is any file an
employee uses, or that a 'personnel department' is any department in which an
employee serves." Id. The Court went on to note that the term "personnel," when
used to modify "rule or practice," is generally understood to be about personnel, in
that it relates to employee relations or human resources, and notfor personnel. See
id. One looking at the EQSD data could not say "that the data and maps relate to
'personnel rules and practices."' Id. Therefore, the Court rejected the
Government's "clean slate" approach to Exemption 2, which "stripp[ed] the word
'personnel' of any meaning" and would violate the narrow construction of
Exemption 2 that Congress intended. Id. at 1269-70.
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Impact:
This case has a wide impact on all administrative organizations
required to disclose information under the FOIA. As the Court itself
stated, "[W]e acknowledge that our decision today upsets three
decades of agency practice relying on Crooker, and therefore may
force considerable adjustments."l36 But, even so, there are additional
methods by which the Government may protect sensitive
information: "We also note, however, that the Government has other
tools on hand to shield national security information and other
materials," such as Exemptions 1, 3, and 7, which respectively
prevent access to (1) classified documents, (2) records that any other
statute exempts from disclosure, and (2) information compiled for
law enforcement purposes that meets one of several criteria,
including where the disclosure of such law enforcement material
"could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety
of any individual." 13 7 So, while this case may have a broad impact
on agencies who had previously relied on Exemption 2 as
justification for many of their withholdings in that they may no
longer use that exemption beyond matters related to employee
relations and human resources, not all hope is lost because agencies
have additional protections and exemptions at their disposal to
protect and withhold from disclosure information that impacts
national security or the lives and safety of individuals.
Graham County Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. Wilson,
130 S. Ct. 1396 (2010)
Synopsis:
Under the False Claims Act ("FCA"), both the Attorney General
and private qui tam relators may bring an action to recover from
persons who make false or fraudulent payment claims to the United
States; however, qui tam actions are barred where the basis of the
action is the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in an
administrative report, hearing, audit, or investigation.'38 Here,
Respondent Karen T. Wilson ("Respondent" or "Wilson") alerted
136 Id. at 1271.
137 Id
1' Graham County Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. Wilson, 130 S. Ct.
1396, 1398 (2010) (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)).
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federal and local officials about possible fraud in federal contracts
seeking to remediate areas in two North Carolina counties that had
been damaged by flooding.' 39 "Wilson filed a qui tam action,
alleging ... that petitioners, county conservation districts and local
and federal officials, knowingly submitted false payment claims in
violation of the FCA."l 40 However, "[b]oth the county and the State
issued reports identifying irregularities in the contracts'
administration."141 Because of these reports, the District Court
dismissed Wilson's case for lack of jurisdiction, but the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that "only federal
administrative reports may trigger the public disclosure bar."l 42 The
Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari and determined
that the "reference to 'administrative' reports, audits, and
investigations in [Section] 3730(e)(4)(A) encompasses disclosures
made in state and local sources as well as federal sources." 43
Facts, Analysis, and Ruling:
In 1995, the United States Department of Agriculture ("USDA")
entered into contracts with two North Carolina counties that enabled
those counties or others they hired to cleanup and repair areas that
had been damaged by flooding, with the Federal Government
covering seventy-five percent of the contract costs.14 Wilson, at that
time an employee of the Graham County Soil and Water
Conservation District, the special purpose government body with
partial responsibility for the cleanup and repair efforts, suspected
possible fraud in connection with the remediation effort, so she
voiced her concerns to various government agencies and officials,
including local officials and the USDA.145 Pursuant to her concerns,
Graham County officials launched an investigation, and the
accounting firm hired as part of this investigation produced an audit
report ("Audit Report") that "identified several potential irregularities
' See Wilson, 130 S. Ct. at 1398.
140Id.
14 1 Id.
142 See id. (emphasis added).
143 See id.
'" See id. at 1400.
145 See id.
31-1
in the county's administration of the contracts."146 The North
Carolina Department of Environment, Health, and Natural Resources
also released a report ("DEHNR Report") around the same time that
identified similar problems, and the USDA later issued a report with
additional findings. 147
In 2001, Wilson filed a qui tam action alleging, inter alia, that the
Graham County and Cherokee Conservation Districts and various
local and federal officials had violated the FCA by knowingly
submitting false claims for payment under the 1995 contracts.
Eventually, the District Court dismissed Wilson's claim for lack of
jurisdiction because she "had failed to refute that her action was
based upon allegations publicly disclosed in the Audit Report and the
DEHNR Report," which reports were, according to the District
Court, administrative reports within the meaning of the public
disclosure bar in Section 3730(e)(4)(A). 148 The Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals, however, reversed the lower court's judgment because
the reports had been generated by local and state authorities and not a
federal authority, and the Fourth Circuit read the public disclosure
bar as qualifying only federal administrative reports, audits, or
investigations as public disclosures within the meaning of the
statute. 149 Because there was a split in the Circuits over this issue of
whether only federal administrative reports, audits, or investigations
qualify as public disclosures under the FCA, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari.s 0
The public disclosure bar in Section 3730(e)(4)(A) of the FCA
reads as follows:
No court shall have jurisdiction over an action
under this section based upon the public disclosure of
allegations or transactions [1] in a criminal, civil, or
administrative hearing, [2] in a congressional,
administrative, or Government Accounting Office
report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or [3] from the
news media, unless the action is brought by the
146 d.
147 See id
148 Id at 1401.
149 See id.
150 See id
Spring 2011 Legal Summaries 421
422 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary
Attorney General or the person bringing the action is
an original source of the information.'s'
The issue here turns on the meaning of "administrative" in the
second category and whether it is limited to forums federal in nature
or whether it extends to local and state sources such as the Audit and
DEHNR Reports here.' 52 In debating this question, petitioners relied
primarily on the text of the statute in support of their argument, while
respondent relied on considerations of history and policy in support
of her argument.153
Looking at the text of the statute, the Court remarked that the
term administrative, when used to modify "report, hearing, audit, or
investigation," in the context of a statute about "public disclosure" of
fraud on the United States, is "most naturally read to describe the
activities of governmental agencies."154 "Given that 'administrative'
is not itself modified by 'federal,' there is no immediately apparent
textual basis for excluding the activities of state and local agencies
(or their contractors) from its ambit."'" The statute itself does not
expressly limit its reach to federal activities, nor is there anything
inherently federal about the word "administrative."' 56 Despite this,
the Court of Appeals reached the conclusion that "administrative" is
limited to federal sources using the interpretive maxim noscitur a
sociis, which means, "It is known by its associates."' 5 7 This maxim
"counsels lawyers reading statutes that 'a word may be known by the
company it keeps." 5 8 Because the terms that surround
"administrative" in the statute-"congressional" and "Government
Accounting Office"-are clearly federal in nature, the Court of
Appeals reasoned that this strongly suggests that "administrative"
should "likewise be restricted to federal administrative reports,
5 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A).
152 See Wilson, 130 S. Ct. at 1402.
11 See id. at 1402.
I54 Id.
I55 Id.
156 See id.
157 See id.
15 Id. (quoting Russell Motor Car Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 514, 519
(1923)).
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hearings, audits, or investigations."l 59 The Supreme Court, however,
found this application of noscitur a sociis to be unpersuasive, stating,
"A list of three items, each quite distinct from the other no matter
how construed, is too short to be particularly illuminating."1 60
Because the adjectives in Category 2 of Section 3730(e)(4)(A) are
too few and disparate to qualify as "items in a list" or a "string of
statutory terms," the Court turned to the broader context of
"administrative" within the statute. 16 1
Looking at the broader context, the Court took the position, as did
petitioners, that all of the sources listed in Section 3730(e)(4)(A)
provide interpretive guidance, not just the sources immediately
surrounding "administrative," as respondent argued. 162 "All of these
sources drive at the same end: specifying the types of disclosures that
can foreclose qui tam actions."163 Because "[c]ourts have a 'duty to
construe statutes, not isolated provisions,"' the Court considered the
entire text of Section 3730(e)(4)(A) and not just the three categories
within that section individually as isolated islands.1 ' Looking at the
term "news media" in Category 3, the Court remarked that while the
"Federal Government funds certain media outlets, and certain private
outlets have a national focus ... no one contends that Category 3 is
limited to these sources."165 "There is likewise no textual basis for
assuming that the 'criminal, civil, or administrative hearing[s]' listed
in Category 1 must be federal hearings."1 66 "If the Court of Appeals
was correct that the term 'administrative' encompasses state and
local sources in Category 1, [citations], it becomes even harder to see
why the term would not do the same in Category 2."l67 The Court
further dismissed respondent's argument that the sources listed in
1" See Wilson, 130 S. Ct. at 1403 (quoting Wilson, 528 F.3d 292, 302 (4th Cir.
2008)).
160 Wilson, 130 S. Ct. at 1403.
161 See id. at 1403-04.
162 See id. at 1404.
163
166Jd
167 Id.
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Category 1 are themselves only federal by stating, "No court has ever
taken such a view of these sources."1 6 8
In sum, although the term 'administrative' may be
sandwiched in Category 2 between terms that are
federal in nature, those terms are themselves
sandwiched between phrases that have been generally
understood to include nonfederal sources; and one of
those phrases, in Category 1, contains the exact term
that is the subject of our inquiry. These textual clues
negate the force of the noscitur a sociis canon, as it
was applied by the Court of Appeals. 1 69
Thus, the Court reasoned that the textual reading of the statute
does not give rise to the inference that "administrative" as used in
Category 2 of Section 3730(e)(4)(A) is endowed with exclusively
federal character. 7 0
The Court next turned to address arguments relying on
considerations of history and policy for their support. "As originally
enacted, the FCA did not limit the sources from which a relator could
acquire the information to bring a qui tam action." 71 This lack of a
limit allowed parasitic suits, even where the relator discovered the
fraud by reading a federal criminal indictment! 72 Congress reacted
in 1943 by passing what "came to be known as a Government
knowledge bar: '[O]nce the United States learned of a false claim,
only the Government could assert its rights under the FCA against
the false claimant. "'173 The years following that amendment saw a
decline in the volume and efficacy of qui tam litigation, and the
Court again sought to reform the qui tam system in 1986 in order to
achieve a balance between adequate incentives for whistle-blowing
insiders and discouragement of opportunistic plaintiffs who have no
significant information of their own to contribute.174 The present text
'
6 1 Id at 1405. The Court also noted that such arguments are not supported by
the statute's text either. See id.
'
6 9 Id. at 1406.170 See id.
171 Id.
172 See id.
173 Id. (quoting Hughes Aircraft Co. v. united States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S.
939, 949 (1997)).
174 See id. at 1406-07.
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of Section 3730(e)(4)(A) was enacted in 1986 as part of this reform,
and Congress replaced the Government knowledge bar with the
public disclosure bar in an effort to achieve the balance mentioned
above.' Respondent argues that this historical background of
Section 3730(e)(4)(A) favors the view of "administrative" as an
exclusively federal interpretation for three separate reasons.1 6 First,
she argues that the drafting history of the public disclosure bar
suggests that Congress intended such a result.17 7 Second, because a
major aim of the 1986 amendments was to limit the scope of the
Government knowledge bar, construing Section 3730(e)(4)(A) as
exclusively federal furthers this purpose by encouraging more private
enforcement suits; and third, the Attorney General is much less likely
to learn of fraud disclosed in state or local proceedings.178 As a
policy argument, respondent further argued that "it would be perverse
to include nonfederal sources in Category 2, as local governments
would then be able to shield themselves from qui tam liability by
discretely disclosing evidence of fraud in 'public' reports." 179 The
Court addressed each of these arguments in turn.
In response to the first argument, the Court noted that "the
drafting history of the public disclosure bar raises more questions
than it answers."1 80 It also noted that significant substantive changes
were made without floor debate, and "[n]either the House nor the
Senate Committee Report explained why a federal limitation would
be appropriate, and the subsequent addition of 'administrative'
sources ... might be taken as a sign that such a limitation was
rejected by the full Chambers.""8 ' In light of the statute's muddy
drafting history, the Court also noted in response to respondent's
second argument that "there is no 'evident legislative purpose' to
guide [the Court's] resolution of the discrete issue [before it]."' 82
1" See id. at 1407.
176 See id.
17 See id.
17 See id
17 d.
180 1d.
' Id. at 1408.
182 Id. at 1409.
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In response to respondent's third argument, the Court noted that
respondent's proposition is not implausible but is still "sheer
conjecture."' 83 Furthermore, the Court pointed out that the right
question is "whther the allegations of fraud have been 'public[ly]
disclos[ed],' . . . not whether they have landed on the desk of a DOJ
lawyer."l 84
In response to the public policy concern that local and state
"governments will insulate themselves from qui tam liability 'though
careful, low key "disclosures"' of potential fraud," the Court
remarked that such "argument rests not just on speculation but indeed
on rather strained speculation."' 8 5 As elucidated by petitioners,
"Given the fact that the submission of a false claim to the United
States submits a defendant to criminal liability, fines, [and other
damages], no rational entity would prepare a report that self-discloses
fraud with the sole purpose of cutting off qui tam actions." 186
Furthermore, the Court noted, "Congress carefully preserved the
rights of the most deserving qui tam plaintiffs: those whistle-blowers
who qualify as original sources [notwithstanding public
disclosure]. "18
Based on the above reasoning and analysis, the Court concluded
that the term "administrative" in Category 2 of Section 3730(e)(4)(A)
is not limited to federal sources, and thus reversed the judgment of
the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further
proceedings. 188
Impac :
By holding that the term "administrative" in Category 2 of
Section 3730(e)(4)(A) includes local and state disclosures, the Court
limited the number of qui tam actions that can be brought. In other
words, if there is some level of administrative government
involvement and disclosure through an audit, investigation, report, or
hearing, whether that government is local, state, or federal, courts are
1 83 Id.
184 Id. at 1410.
185 Id.
186 Id
'
8 1 Id. Whether respondent here could qualify as an original source is "one of
many issues that remain[ed] open on remand." Id. at 1411.
188 See id.
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prevented from having jurisdiction over a qui tam action based upon
that disclosure, unless the plaintiff is the "original source" of the
information. The Court makes the case that this limit of qui tam
actions is in line with the prevention of parasitic plaintiffs and that
sufficient protections are afforded true whistle-blowers who may
qualify as the "original source." This definition holds water when the
definition of "original source" is examined: "A separate statutory
provision defines an 'original source' as 'an individual who has
direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the
allegations are based and has voluntarily provided the information to
the Government before filing an action under this section which is
based on this information."" 89 Thus, where a private individual
discovers a false claim independent of the government, and notifies
the government of this information, that individual may file an action
under the FCA regardless of whether the government later makes a
public disclosure of the allegations. However, an issue may arise in
the situation where a private individual and the government discover
the false claim independent of each other and the government
publicly discloses the allegations before the private individual can
provide to the government the information on which the allegations
are based; this issue, however, would align more with an
interpretation of the original source definition in Section
3730(e)(4)(B) and not necessarily as much with Section
3730(e)(4)(A).
Mayo Found. For Med. Educ. & Research v. United States,
131 S. Ct. 704 (2011)
Synopsis:
Petitioners ("Mayo") offer residency programs to medical school
graduates who seek additional instruction in a given specialty. 90
Participants in these programs-"residents"-are trained primarily
through hands-on experience-the bulk of their time, fifty to eighty
hours a week, is spent caring for patients-but they also receive
formal education training.191 Residents receive so-called "stipends"
" See id. at 1402 n.4 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B)).
190 Mayo Found. For Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704,
706 (2011).
191 See id.
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over $40,000 from Petitioner and are provided with health insurance,
malpractice insurance, and paid vacation time.' 9 2 The Federal
Insurance Contributions act ("FICA") requires employees and
employers to pay taxes on all "wages" earned by employees.1 93
"Wages" is defined by statute to encompass "all remuneration for
employment," and FICA defines "employment" to mean "any service
... performed . .. by an employee for the person employing him,"
but exempts any "service performed in the employ of... a school,
college, or university .. . if such service is performed by a student
who is enrolled and regularly attending classes at [the school]."l94
"In 2004, the [Treasury] Department issued regulations providing
that '[t]he services of a full time employee'-which includes an
employee normally scheduled to work 40 hours or more per week-
'are not incident to and for the purpose of pursuing a course of
study.'" 9 5 The Department maintains that this analysis "is not
affected by the fact that the services . .. may have an educational,
instructional, or training aspect," and the "rule offers as an example a
medical resident whose normal schedule requires him to perform
services 40 or more hours per week, and concludes that the resident
is not a student." 96 Mayo filed suit challenging this rule as invalid,
and the District Court agreed.19 7 The Eighth Circuit, however,
reversed, applying the Chevron framework and concluding that the
regulation was a permissible interpretation of an ambiguous
statute.1 98 The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari,
and, upon review, determined that the Treasury Department's full-
time employee rule is a reasonable construction of Section
3121(b)(10).' 99
192 See id
193 See id.
194
1 Id.
196jd
197 See id.
198 See id
'9 See id.
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Facts, Analysis, and Ruling:
Individuals who graduate from medical school typically pursue
additional education in a specialty by means of a medical
residency. 200 Mayo offers such residency programs, and these
programs generally last three to five years and consist mainly of
hands-on experience and training.201 "Residents often spend between
50 and 80 hours a week caring for patients .... [and] are generally
supervised in this work by more senior residents and by faculty
members known as attending physicians."202 Mayo pays its residents
an annual "stipend" ranging from $41,000 to $56,000 and provides
for them health insurance, malpractice insurance, and paid vacation
time. 203 In addition to their work duties, residents also participate in
an educational program: "they are assigned textbooks and journal
articles to read and are expected to attend weekly lectures and other
conferences ... . [They] also take written exams." 204 But the "bulk of
residents' time is spent caring for patients."205
Congress has created a national insurance system-Social
Security-that provides benefits to retired, disabled, and unemployed
workers, and this system is funded by taxing employees and
employers under FICA on the wages employees earn.206 "Wages" is
defined by Congress as "all remuneration for employment," and
"employment" is similarly broadly defined as "any service, of
whatever nature, performed .. . by an employee for the person
employing him."207 Congress has also created, however, certain
exemptions from FICA's demands, including "service performed in
the employ of . . . a school, college, or university . .. if such service
is performed by a student who is enrolled and regularly attending
classes at such school, college, or university." 208 Dating as far back
as 1951, the Treasury Department has applied this exception to
200 See id. at 708. The purpose of this additional education and training is to
become board certified and to practice in that specialty field. See id.
201 See id.
202 Id
203 See id.
2 04 Id at 708-09.
205 Id at 709.
206 See id.
207 See id.
208 Id.
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"exempt from taxation student who work for their schools 'as an
incident to and for the purpose of pursuing a course of study'
there."2 09 Prior to 2005, an individual's eligibility for this exemption
was determined on a case-by-case basis in consideration of the
number of hours worked and the course load taken.2 10 The Social
Security Administration ("SSA"), which had a similar provision for
students, also evaluates cases on a singular basis, but has "always
held that resident physicians are not students."211 When the Eighth
Circuit held in 1998 that the SSA could not categorically exclude
residents from student status, the Internal revenue Service ("IRS")
was faced with "more than 7,000 claims seeking FICA tax refunds on
the ground that medical residents qualifies as students under
[Section] 3121(b)(10) of the Internal Revenue Code."212 Faced with
this deluge of claims, the Treasury Department adopted and issued a
new rule "prescribing that an employee's service is 'incident' to his
studies only when '[tlhe educational aspect of the relationship
between the employer and the employee, as compared to the service
aspect of the relationship, [is] predominant."' 2 13 "The rule
categorically provides that '[t]he services of a full-time employee'-
as defined by the employer's policies, but in any event including any
employee normally scheduled to work 40 hours or more per week-
'are not incident to and for the purpose of pursuing a course of
study."' 214
After the Department promulgated this rule, Mayo filed suit,
asserting that its residents were exempt under Section 3121 (b)(10)
and that the rule was invalid.215 The District Court granted summary
209Id.
210 See id.
211 Id.
212 d/
213 Id. at 709-10.
214 1d. at 710. In addition, "The amended provision clarifies that the
Department's analysis 'is not affected by the fact that the services performed ...
may have an educational, instructional, or training aspect." Id. The rule included
as an example a medical resident employed by a university; in the example, the
resident's normal work schedule calls for him to perform 40 or more hours of work
per week, and because of this, according to the rule, his service is "not incident to
and for the purpose of pursuing a course of study," and he is not an exempt student.
Id.
215 See id.
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judgment for Mayo, holding that the full-time employee rule is
inconsistent with the unambiguous text of Section 3121.216 The
Court of Appeals, however, reversed in its application of the standard
set forth in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. National Resources Defense
Council, Inc.2 17 The Supreme Court of the United States granted
certiorari.2 18
The Court began its analysis with the "first step of the two-part
framework announced in Chevron ... and ask[ed] whether Congress
has 'directly addressed the precise question at issue."' 2 19 The Court
reasoned that Congress had not done so: "The statute does not define
the term 'student,' and does not otherwise attend to the precise
question whether medical residents are subject to FICA."2 20
Ordinarily, the Court would automatically turn to the second step
of the two-part Chevron framework, but the parties here disagreed as
to the proper framework to be used.22' On one hand, the government
argued for the use of the Chevron framework at step two, under
which a court "may not disturb an agency rule unless it is 'arbitrary
or capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute."'
222
On the other hand, Mayo argued for the use of the multi-factor test
used in National Muffler,2 23 a less deferential test that may "view an
216 See id.
217 467 U.S 837 (1984).
218 Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 710.
2191 d. at 711.
220 Id. Mayo argued that the full-time employee rule must be rejected at step
one of Chevron, contending that the dictionary definition of "student"--one who
engages in study by applying the mind to acquisition of learning-plainly
encompasses residents. See id. In addition, Mayo argued, students fulfill the
limitation imposed by Congress on students-that they be "enrolled and regularly
attending classes at school." See id. However, "Mayo's reading does not eliminate
the statute's ambiguity as applied to working professionals." Id. The Court further
noted that, "To the extent Congress has specifically addressed medical residents in
[Section] 3121, moreover, it has expressly excluded these doctors from exemptions
they might otherwise invoke." Id. "That choice casts doubt on any claim that
Congress specifically intended to insulate medical residents from FICA's reach in
the first place." Id.
221 See id.
222 Id. "The sole question for the Court at step two under the Chevron analysis
is 'whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute."' Id. at 712.
223 National Muffler Dealers Assn., Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979).
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agency's interpretation of a statute with heightened skepticism when
it has not consistent over time, when it was promulgated years after
the relevant statute was enacted, or because of the way in which the
regulation evolved."224
However, the Court noted that Mayo did not advance any
justification for applying a less deferential standard of review to
Treasury Department regulations than is applied to the regulations of
any other agency, and absent such justification, there is no reason the
Court should not use the deferential Chevron analysis to the same
extent the Court uses it to review other regulations. 225 "Chevron
deference is appropriate 'when it appears that Congress delegated
authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of
law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was
promulgate in the exercise of that authority."' 226 Here, the Treasury
Department "issued the full-time employee rule pursuant to an
explicit authorization [by Congress] to 'prescribe all needful rules
and regulations for the enforcement ' of the Internal Revenue
Code." 227 Both this express authorization from Congress to engage
in the prcess of rulemaking and the fact that the Department issued
the rule in question only after notice-and-comment procedures were
significant indicators that the rule merits Chevron treatment and
224 Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 712. In contrast, under a Chevron analysis, "deference
to an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute does not turn on such
considerations." Id. "We have repeatedly held that '[a]gency inconsistency is not
a basis for declining to analyze the agency's interpretation under the Chevron
framework."' Id.
225 See id. at 713. Mayo argued that because a tax regulation was at issue in
National Muffler, and the Court used the less deferential multi-factor analysis there,
because a tax regulation is at issue here, the Court should use the same test used in
National Muffler here as well. See id. at 712-13. The Court noted, however, "In
the absence of [any] justification [for applying a less deferential standard], we are
not inclined to carve out an approach to administrative review good for tax law
only. To the contrary, we have expressly '[r]ecogniz[ed] the importance of
maintaining a uniform approach to judicial review of administrative action."' Id. at
713 (quoting Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154 (1999)).
226 Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 713 (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S.
218, 226-27 (2001)). "Our inquiry in this regard does not turn on whether
Congress's delegation of authority was general or specific." Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at
714.
227 Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 714 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a)).
31-1
deference. 22 8 "[T]he ultimate question is whether Congress would
have intended, and expected, courts to treat [the regulation] as within,
or outside, its delegation to the agency of 'gap-filling' authority." 229
In the Long Island Care case, we found that
Chevron provided the appropriate standard of review
"[w]here an agency rule sets forth important
individual rights and duties, where the agency focuses
fully and directly upon the issue, where the agency
uses full notice-and-comment procedures to
promulgate a rule, [and] where the resulting rule falls
within the statutory grant of authority." [citations
omitted] These same considerations point to the same
result here. This case falls squarely within the bounds
of, and is properly analyzed under, Chevron and
Mead.230
Having determined that the Chevron framework was appropriate,
the Court turned to the second step of that framework and inquired
"whether the Department's rule is a 'reasonable interpretation' of the
enacted text." 23 1 Under this inquiry, the Court reasoned, the full-time
employee rule "easily satisfies" the second step of Chevron.232
"Focusing on the hours an individual works and the hours he spends
in studies is a perfectly sensible way" of distinguishing between
workers who study and students who work.2 33 Because the rule is
"not one to which Congress has directly spoken, and because the rule
is a reasonable construction of what Congress has said," the Court
affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 234
npac t:
The impact of this case is that it furthered the importance of the
use of the deferential Chevron framework when reviewing
administrative rules and regulations. As the Court noted, it must use
228 Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 714.
229 Id.
23o Id. (quoting Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. V. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 173
(2007)).
231 Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 714.
232 Id.
233 Id. at 715.
234 Id. at 716.
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Chevron's highly deferential standard unless it is given a compelling
reason to use a less deferential standard such as that found in
National Muffler.235 The Court also noted the significantly changed
administrative landscape since Chevron.236
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Actavis Elizabeth LLC v. FDA, 625 F.3d 760 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
Synopsis:
The FDA awarded five year exclusivity to a name-brand drug
manufacturer for the manufacture of a drug used to treat Attention
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder ("ADHD"), and appellant, Actavis
Elizabeth LLC ("Appellant" or "Actavis"), a generic drug
manufacturer, challenged this award. The name-brand drug
manufacturer intervened, and it and the FDA moved for summary
judgment, which the District Court granted. Upon review, the Court
of Appeal held that the drug was entitled to five year market
exclusivity under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
("FDCA").
Facts, Analysis, and Ruling:
New drugs, even generic versions of previously approved drugs,
must be approved by the FDA before they are put on the market.237
The FDCA governs the approval process, and it must be shown that
the drug is safe and effective before it is approved.23 8 The Hatch-
Waxman Amendments to the FDCA provide that when generic drugs
are submitted for approval, they may gain approval though what is
called an "abbreviated new drug application," meaning that the
applicant may, among other things, "rely on clinical studies
submitted as part of a previous new drug application." 239 "The
Hatch-Waxman Amendments also grant various period of marketing
235 See id. at 713.
236 See id.
23 7Actavis Elizabeth LLC v. FDA, 625 F.3d 760, 761 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
238 See id.
239 Id. This holds true as long as long as the generic drug contains the same
active ingredients as an already "listed:" drug. See id.
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exclusivity to certain pioneer drugs approved" by the FDA. 240 To
qualify for five year exclusivity, an approved drug must contain no
previously approved active moieties; that is, the drug must contain a
2411new chemical entity.
"In 2005, New River Pharmaceuticals, the predecessor in interest
to intervenor-defendant Shire Pharmaceuticals, sought approval to
market lisdexamfetamine dimesylate for the treatment of [ADHD]
under the brand name Vyvanse." 242 The FDA approved this drug in
2007 and granted it five-year exclusivity under FDA regulations.243
In 2009, Actavis submitted an abbreviated application for the generic
drug lisdexamfetamine dimesylate; however, the FDA returned the
application, which mentioned Vyvanse, because the five-year period
had not yet expired. 244 "Actavis brought this suit in the district court
under the Administrative Procedure Act, seeking to force the agency
to rescind its grant of exclusivity to Vyvanse and to accept Actavis'
abbreviated application." 45 The FDA, in performing its own
administrative review of the matter, affirmed its original
determination, and the District Court eventually granted summary
judgment to the FDA and Shire.246
The Court thought it important to briefly describe the chemical
structure of lisdexamfetamine dimesylate in order to understand
Actavis' arguments. 2 47 Lisdexamfetamine dimesylate is a salt of
lisdexamfetamine. 248 Because salts are not considered active
moieties by the FDA, the FDA focused its analysis on the
24 1 Id. at 761-62. These exclusivity provisions have been implemented by the
FDA through regulations.
241 See id. at 762. "'Active moiety' is defined as 'the molecule or ion,
excluding those appended portions of the molecule that cause the drug to be an
ester, salt (including salt with hydrogen or coordination bonds), or other
noncovalent derivative (such as a complex, chelate, orclathrate) of the molecule,
responsible for the physiological or pharmacological action of the drug
substance."' Id.
242 Id
243 See id.
244 See id.
2451d
246 See id.
247 See id. at 762-63.
248 See id. at 763.
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lisdexamfetamine molecule alone. 24 9 "Lisdexamfetamine consists of
a portion of lysine, a common amino acid, connected to
dextroamphetamine," and these two portions are "linked by an amide
bond, a type of covalent bond that utilizes a nitrogen atom" to form
the bond.250 "What is important is that once it enters the body,
lisdexamfetamine undergoes a chemical conversion to produce
dextroamphetamine." 251 The Court further noted, "Drugs containing
dextroamphetamine, but not lisdexamfetamine, had received FDA
approval before New River filed its application for Vyvanse." 252
Actavis argued that the award of five-year exclusivity to Vyvanse
conflicted with the FDA's regulations, but the Court found little
merit in this argument. 253 The FDA "interprets its regulations to
allow five-year exclusivity for drugs containing derivative molecules
or previously approved 'active moieties' when those derivative
molecules contain non-ester covalent bonds." 254 As the FDA itself
stated, "Under FDA's interpretation of its regulation, the active
moiety of a molecule with a non-ester covalent bond is the entire
molecule, even if the molecule includes a covalent bond to a
molecule that was itself previously an active moiety."255
"An agency's interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to
judicial deference" unless the agency's interpretation is shown to be
"plainly erroneous or inconsistent with regulation." The regulation
states that the portions of the molecule that cause the drug to be an
ester, salt, or other noncovalent derivative are the only excluded
portions of the molecule for determining the active moiety.256
"When the drug is not in the form of an ester, salt, or other
noncovalent derivative, the FDA treats the entire molecule as that
'responsible for the physiological or pharmacological action of the
drug substance,' and therefore a separate moiety."257 Because any
249 See id.
250
251 Id
252
253 See id.
254 Id. An ester bond is one that uses an oxygen atom to perform the linking
function. See id
255 Id
256 See id.
257 Id
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drug that does not contain a previously approved active moiety may
receive five-year exclusivity, certain types of prodrugs, such as
lisdexamfetamine, that are not esters, salts, or other types of
noncovalent derivatives are eligible for five-year exclusivity.258 As
such, the agency's interpretation is neither plainly erroneous nor
inconsistent with the FDA's regulations. 259
Actavis also argued that the FDA's interpretation is inconsistent
with the clear meaning of the statute. 26o The Hatch-Waxman
Amendments permit the five-year grant of exclusivity to drugs "no
active ingredient (including any ester or salt of the active ingredient)
of which" has been previously approved by the FDA for the
market.261 Actavis argues that this language prevents the FDA from
granting five-year exclusivity rights to a drug that contains "a drug
molecule that eventually produces a previously approved drug
molecule in the body." 262 In other words, according to Actavis,
although lisdexamfetamine itself has not been approved, because it
produces dextroamphetamine, a drug molecule that has already been
approved by the FDA, when consumed, lisdexamfetamine should not
be able to qualify for a grant of five-year exclusivity.263 In support of
this argument, Actavis relied on the term "active ingredient," which
Actavis argues compels and even obligates the FDA to consider "the
particular drug molecule that reaches the 'site' of the drug's
action." 264 Under this argument, if the molecule that produces the
drug's therapeutic effect "has been previously approved, then five-
year exclusivity is not warranted." 265 "But," the Court noted, "there
is nothing to indicate that Congress used the term in the sense
Actavis urges." 26 6 "The agency has concluded that, for certain types
of prodrugs, the entire pre-ingestion drug molecule should be deemed
responsible for the drug's activity, which can include its 'distribution
258 See id.
259 See id.
260 See id. at 764.
261 See id.
262 Id.
263 See id.
2641d
265 Id.
266 Id
437Spring 2011 Legal Summaries
438 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary
within the body, its metabolism, its excretion, or its toxicity."' 267
"There is no reason to believe Congress thought differently--or
thought about it at all."268
In addition, Actavis contended that the structure and purpose of
the statute in question proscribe the FDA's interpretation, claiming
that the statute "reserves five-year exclusivity only for major
innovations."2 69 In support of this argument, Actavis offered a
"scenario in which drug companies such as Shire are able to maintain
never-ending periods of five-year exclusivity for 'minor' variations
on already drug molecules simply by adding different covalent
appendages to them."270 But the Court found no grounding for this
view in reality, stating that '[i]n the nearly two decades since the
current FDA regulations came into effect, there is no such example,
or at least none that Actavis has identified." 271 "[Because] nothing in
the text, structure, purpose, or legislative history of the statute
'speaks directly to the precise question at issue,' the agency's
interpretation must stand if it is reasonable."272 Because nothing in
the record established the FDA's interpretation as unreasonable, the
Court deferred to the FDA's interpretation and upheld the grant of
summary judgment to the FDA and Shire.
Imtac:
The Court here seemed extremely deferential to the agency,
seemingly because of the complexity and scientific, technical nature
of the subject matter involved. The Court seemed to focus on
dismissing the plaintiff s arguments more so than it did on fully
analyzing the law. This case could lead one to believe that plaintiffs
challenging agency decisions, regulations, and rules may have
difficulty prevailing where the subject matter is highly complex or
scientific because the court will likely defer, as it did here, to the
agency's interpretation because of the agency's "expertise."
267 Id
** Id.
269 See id. at 765.
270 1d
271 Id.
272fd
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Hardin v. Jackson, 625 F.3d 739 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
Synopsis:
Appellants, two tomato farmers, brought an action against the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"),
Jackson, challenging the registration of a particular type of weed
control pesticides for rice crops, claiming that the pesticides had been
drifting over to their tomato crops and damaging them. The District
Court granted the EPA's motion to dismiss based on a lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction on the ground that the appellants did not
file the complaint until 2004, beyond the six year limitation period
prescribed. The Court of Appeals agreed with the court below that
the action is time-barred and held that the farmer's action accrued as
early as the date they filed previous state court actions against
pesticide applicators.
Facts. Analysis, and Ruling:
In 1992, BASF Corporation ("BASF") submitted an application
for registration of Facet 50, a pesticide containing the active
ingredient quinclorac and used for rice crops. 27 3 Later in 1992, the
EPA notified BASF that it had registered Facet 50 under 7 U.S.C. §
136a(c)(7)(A) & (B).27 4 Subsequently, in 1994 and 1998, the EPA
registered two additional products containing quinclorac, Facet 75
DF and Facet GR, under subsection (c)(7)(A).
273 Hardin v. Jackson, 625 F.3d 739, 741 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
274 See id. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA")
mandates that a pesticide be registered with the EPA before it can be distributed or
sold. See id. at 740. Under FIFRA, the registration is either unconditional under
Section 136a(c)(5) or conditional under 136a(c)(7). See id. Section 137a(c)(7)(A)
applies to pesticides if the pesticide "and proposed use are identical or substantially
similar to any currently registered pesticide and use thereof, or differ only in ways
that would not significantly increase the risk of unreasonable adverse effects on the
environment," and subsection (c)(7)(B) applies where a pesticide's registration is
amended "to permit additional uses of such pesticides." See id. The third
conditional registration, in subsection (c)(7)(C), is where the pesticide contains "an
active ingredient not contained in any currently registered pesticide," and the
pesticide may be conditionally registered "for a period reasonably sufficient for the
generation and submission of required data," but "only if [the EPA] determines that
use of the pesticide during such period will not cause any unreasonable adverse
effect on the environment, and that use of the pesticide is in the public interest."
Id.
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"Beginning in March 1995, the appellants filed multiple civil
actions in Arkansas state court against Facet applicators, alleging that
'drift' from the sprayed Facet was damaging their tomato crops." 275
And in 2000, the appellants filed a class action against BASF in
federal district court, but the District Court granted summary
judgment for BASF on the ground that the action was preempted by
FIFRA.276 On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, that Court remanded; and
on remand the parties settled.277 In 2003, the appellants filed an
administrative petition with the EPA to revoke or suspend and cancel
registration of Facet pesticides, and while this petition was pending,
in 2004, the appellants filed the action at issue here against the EPA,
alleging causes of action under the FIFRA, the Mandamus Act, and
the Administrative Procedure Act-all three claims were based on
the EPA's conditional registration of Facet 50 in 1992.278 The
complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief and an award of
costs, including attorney's fees. 279
The EPA moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it
was filed beyond the statute of limitations, and the Court eventually
"dismissed the complaint for failure to commence the suit within six
years after the appellants' right of action accrued pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2401(a)." 2 8 0 The appellants then filed a timely appeal with
the D.C. Circuit.28'
The Court of Appeals first examined the language of the statute
of limitations, which reads as follows:
275 Id. at 741.
276 See id.
277 See id.
278 See id. "According to the appellants, because EPA had not previously
registered a quinclorac pesticide, Facet 50 was ineligible both for registration under
subsection 3(c)(7)(A) ... and for amended registration under subsection 3(c)(7)(B)
("to permit additional uses")-the subsections identified in the Facet 50 registration
notice." Id. Appellants contended that the Facet 50 product, containing an active
ingredient not found in any other registered pesticide, was eligible only for
conditional registration under subsection (c)(7)(C), which requires that the EPA
determine that use of the product will not have an adverse effect on the
environment and will be in the general interest of the public. See id. at 742.
279 See id.
280 See id.
281 See id.
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Except as provided by the Contract Disputes Act
of 1978, every civil action commenced against the
United States shall be barred unless the complaint is
filed within six years after the right of action first
accrues. The action of any person under legal
disability or beyond the seas at the time the claim
accrues may be commenced within three years after
the disability ceases.282
"Under this statute, a party challenging final agency action must
commence his suit within six years after the right of action accrues[,]
and the 'right of action first accrues on the date of the final agency
action."' 283 Thus, applying this rule here, the appellants' right of
action accrued on October 13, 1992, when the EPA finalized
registration of Facet 50.284 However, there is an exception to the
above rule known as the "discovery rule." 285
"Under the discovery rule, 'a cause of action accrues when the
injured party discovers-or in the exercise of due diligence should
have discovered-that it has been injured. "'286 The appellants
contend that, under this rule, their right to action accrued when they
"discovered their procedural injuries, which did not occur until at
least July 2000 when BASF raised its preemption defense in the
Arkansas class action and thereby put them on notice that the Facet
products had been registered under FIFRA." 287 Therefore, under this
application of the rule, appellants argued, the 2004 filing of the
complaint here was timely.2 88 The Court reasoned, however, that,
"[e]xercising 'due diligence,' the appellants or their counsel should
have discovered" the EPA registration of Facet products "long before
BASF raised it preemption defense in July 2000.",289 "That Facet 50
was registered was obvious from the registration notice appearing on
282 Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 240 1(a)).
283 Hardin, 625 F.3d at 743 (quoting Harris v. FAA, 353 F.3d 1006, 1009-10
(D.C. Cir. 2004)).
284 See Hardin, 625 F.3d at 743.
285 See id.
286 Id. (quoting Nat'1 Treasury Emps. Union v. FLRA, 392 F.3d 498, 501 (D.C.
Cir. 2004)).
287 Hardin, 625 F.3d at 743.
288 See id.
289 Id
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the label of Facet 50-a label with which [appellants] plainly should
have been familiar inasmuch as Facet 50 was the product subjudice"
in the 1995 Arkansas state court action filed by appellants.290
Therefore, as early as 1995, appellants were on notice of the EPA
registration of Facet 50 "and could have requested registration
documentation from EPA that would have revealed Facet 50 had
been conditionally registered, albeit incorrectly, under subsections
3(c)(7)(A) and 3(c)(7)(B)." 2 9 ' According to the Court, if the
appellants believed Facet 50 to be "inherently dangerous" as early as
1995, which the record strongly reflects, there is no reason that
appellants could not have investigated the product's registration as
soon as they were put on notice of it, i.e., when they saw Facet 50's
label, which displayed the FIFRA registration number.292
"Because the appellants knew or should have known of their
injuries no later than 1995 when they filed their state lawsuits, we
conclude that, even under the discovery rule, the statutory limitation
period began to run more than six years before they filed their
complaint in this action on August 3, 2004.",293 Therefore, the Court
affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the suit as time-barred.294
Impac :
This case should give awareness to potential plaintiffs of the
importance of statutes of limitations-if one misses the deadline, the
court has no jurisdiction to hear your case, and your case will be
thrown out of court. In addition, this case helped clarify when the
right of action accrues in civil cases against the government, which is
generally on the date of the final agency action or, in certain
circumstances pursuant to the discovery rule, when the injured party
discovers or should have discovered through due diligence that it has
been injured.
290 Id. at 743-44.
291 Id at 744.
292 See id.
293 Id at 744-45.
294 See id. at 745.
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